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BIANNUAL SURVEY
CPLR 3121: Blood grouping tests held constitutional.

21
a matrimonial action, the husIn Mestichelli v. Mestihelli,
band moved 217 pursuant to CPLR 312123 for an order directing
his wife and her child to submit to a blood grouping test to
establish his non-paternity, and hence her adultery. The court,
in summarily dismissing the allegation that extraction of blood is
9
violative of the constitutional privilege against self incrimination 21
noted that "historically . . . protection has been limited to oral
testimonial compulsion or the compulsory production of documents

or other articles."

220

Although not violative of the privilege against self incrimination, the extraction of bodily fluids may violate the due process
clause where the extraction is performed under circumstances that
shock the judicial conscience. 22 1 However, the United States
Supreme Court has held this objection inapplicable to a blood
test performed by a physician. 222 Hence, CPLR 3121 is constitutional.
Protective orders-effect of CPLR 3103(a) upon five-day
limitation of CPLR 3122.
CPLR 3122 provides: "Within five days of a notice under
rule 3120 or section 3121, a party may serve a notice of motion
CPLR 3103(a)
for a protective order. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
provides: "The court may at any time on its own initiative, or
on motion . . . make a protective order. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The important question is whether a protective order may be had
under 3103(a) after the five days specified in 3122 have
elapsed.
In Farone v. Korey Motors, Inc.,2 2 3 the court commented that
CPLR 3122 should be read in conjunction with CPLR 3103(a)
21644 Misc. 2d 707, 255 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
217 It should be noted that the proper procedure under CPLR 3121 is
to serve notice on the other party, not to proceed by motion.
218 "After commencement of an action in which ... the blood relationship
of a party . . .is in controversy, any party may serve notice on any other
party2 to submit to a . . .blood examination. . ..
19 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957).
220 Mestichelli v. Mestichelli, supra note 216, at 708, 255 N.Y.S.2d at
187.
221 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
222
Breithaupt v. Abram, supra note 219, at 435. In certain situations
there may be a religious objection to extracting body fluids. In such cases
there will be a close question which may turn upon whether the objection
is bona fide. It is suggested that cases concerning vaccination against
contagious disease will not be useful since these cases involved a balance between the individual's belief and public health. CPLR 3121 does not
purport to protect the health of the community. Thus, no balancing can
exist.
22244 Misc. 2d 565, 254 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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and concluded that where good cause is shown for delay a protective
order should be issued under CPLR 3103(a). Under this rationale
it is incumbent upon movant to excuse his failure to comply with
the five-day limitation.
The issue of the five-day limit was presented before the
appellate division in Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc. 224 In that case
Justice Valente stated:
We must make it abundantly clear that the only permissible method for
challenging a notice for discovery is to move for a protective order, within
the time limitations of CPLR Rule 3122. Any other course would only
import into the disclosure practice of the CPLR the abuses against which
our courts inveighed under bills of particulars practice under the CPA. .... 22
While the above quote indicates the restrictive attitude of the
first department it should be noted that in Coffey "no attempt
was made [by the movant] to offer any valid excuse or to show
some good cause for not having applied for a protective order
within the time limited by CPLR Rule 3122." 226
It is- submitted that the Farone case has taken the better approach. Where a special circumstance is shown justifying the
delay the court should excuse the non-compliance with the fiveday requirement. There is explicit authority for such extension
in CPLR 2004 which provides that "the court may extend the
time fixed by any statute . . . upon such terms as may be just
and upon good cause shown. . . ." The application for extension
may be made after the time period has expired. Therefore, by
utilizing CPLR 2004 in conjunction with CPLR 3122 the same
result could be reached as if CPLR 3103(a) alone were applied.
There would appear to be no reason for using the circuitous method
when the desired result can be directly obtained.
It is submitted that CPLR 3103(a) should be literally construed. The phrase "the court may at any time . . . make a
protective order" is unambiguous and clear. It is a mandate that
allows the trial court to use its discretion to further the ends of
justice. 227 Such mandate should not be destroyed by judicial
surgery.

App. Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1964).
Id. at 320, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
Id. at 320, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
See CPLR 317, 5015(a). The discretion reposed in the court under
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CPLR 3103(a) may be analogized to the discretion allowed a judge to open

a default. If a defendant can adequately excuse his default and show that
it would be in the interest of justice to open it, the court has the power

so to do. Why should not the court have the same power when a party
"defaults" by not complying with the five-day limitation of CPLR 3122?

